Aristotle, Rhetoric
Book II - Chapter 11 Emulation
We
will next consider Emulation, showing in what follows its causes and objects,
and the state of mind in which it is felt. Emulation is pain caused by seeing
the presence, in persons whose nature is like our own, of good things that are
highly valued and are possible for ourselves to acquire; but it is felt not
because others have these goods, but because we have not got them ourselves. It
is therefore a good feeling felt by good persons, whereas envy is a bad feeling
felt by bad persons. Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in
question, envy makes us take steps to stop our neighbour having them. [1388b]
Emulation must therefore tend to be felt by persons who believe themselves to deserve
certain good things that they have not got, it being understood that no one
aspires to things which appear impossible. It is accordingly felt by the young
and by persons of lofty disposition. Also by those who possess such good things
as are deserved by men held in honour -- these are wealth, abundance of
friends, public office, and the like; on the assumption that they ought to be
good men, they are emulous to gain such goods because they ought, in their
belief, to belong to men whose state of mind is good. Also by those whom all
others think deserving. We also feel it about anything for which our ancestors,
relatives, personal friends, race, or country are specially honoured, looking
upon that thing as really our own, and therefore feeling that we deserve to
have it. Further, since all good things that are highly honoured are objects of
emulation, moral goodness in its various forms must be such an object, and also
all those good things that are useful and serviceable to others: for men honour
those who are morally good, and also those who do them service. So with those
good things our possession of which can give enjoyment to our neighbours --
wealth and beauty rather than health. We can see, too, what persons are the
objects of the feeling. They are those who have these and similar things --
those already mentioned, as courage, wisdom, public office. Holders of public
office -- generals, orators, and all who possess such powers -- can do many
people a good turn. Also those whom many people wish to be like; those who have
many acquaintances or friends; those whom admire, or whom we ourselves admire;
and those who have been praised and eulogized by poets or prose-writers.
Persons of the contrary sort are objects of contempt: for the feeling and
notion of contempt are opposite to those of emulation. Those who are such as to
emulate or be emulated by others are inevitably disposed to be contemptuous of
all such persons as are subject to those bad things which are contrary to the
good things that are the objects of emulation: despising them for just that
reason. Hence we often despise the fortunate, when luck comes to them without
their having those good things which are held in honour.
This
completes our discussion of the means by which the several emotions may be
produced or dissipated, and upon which depend the persuasive arguments
connected with the emotions.