Book IV Justice in the Individual

Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the 
same quality which makes the State wise?

Certainly. 

Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the 
individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other 
virtues? 

Assuredly.  

And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the 
State is just? 

That follows of course. 

We cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the three classes 
doing the work of its own class? 

We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.

We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their 
own work will be just, and will do his own work? 

Yes, he said, we must remember that too. 

And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to 
rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?  

Certainly. 

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastics will bring them into 
accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating 
and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?  

Quite true, he said.

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own 
functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul 
and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and 
strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no 
longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not 
her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?  

Very true, he said.

Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body 
against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, 
and courageously executing his commands and counsels?

True.  

And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the 
commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear? 

Right, he replied.  

And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these 
commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of 
each of the three parts and of the whole? 

Assuredly.

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly 
harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit 
and desire, are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?  

Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual. 

And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a 
man will be just.  

That is very certain. 

And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which 
we found her to be in the State? 

There is no difference, in my opinion, he said.  

Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will 
satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.

What sort of instances do you mean? 

If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in 
the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit 
of gold or silver? Would anyone deny this? 

No one, he replied. 

Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his 
friends or to his country? 

Never.

Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements.  

Impossible.  

No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonor his father and mother, or to 
fail in his religious duties?

No one. 

And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or 
being ruled?  

Exactly so. 

Are you satisfied, then, that the quality which makes such men and such States is justice, or 
do you hope to discover some other? 

Not I, indeed. 

Then our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning 
of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary 
form of justice, has now been verified?  

Yes, certainly. 

And the division of labor which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of 
the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, 
and for that reason it was of use? 

Clearly.

But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned, however, not with 
the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for 
the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, 
or any of them to do the work of others -- he sets in order his own inner life, and is his 
own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together 
the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle 
notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals -- when he has bound all these together, 
and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted 
nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the 
treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and 
calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition just and good 
action, and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom, and that which at any time 
impairs this condition he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it 
ignorance.

You have said the exact truth, Socrates. 

Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just 
State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?  

Most certainly not. 

May we say so, then? 

Let us say so. 

And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.  

Clearly. 

Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles -- a meddlesomeness, 
and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of 
unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he 
is the natural vassal -- what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and 
intemperance, and cowardice, and ignorance, and every form of vice? 

Exactly so.  

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and 
being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?  

What do you mean? he said. 

Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health 
are in the body.

How so? he said.  

Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.  

Yes.

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

That is certain.  

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by 
another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of 
things at variance with this natural order? 

True. 

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one 
by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the production of a state of 
things at variance with the natural order?  

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue is the health, and beauty, and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease, and 
weakness, and deformity, of the same? 

True. 
And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?  

Assuredly. 

Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been 
answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, 
whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only 
unpunished and unreformed?  

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when 
the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds 
of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when 
the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having 
to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is 
not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both 
to be such as we have described?